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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Technology  assessment  (TA)  has  a  strong  history  of helping  to identify  priorities  and  improve  environ-
mental  sustainability,  cost-effectiveness  and  wider  benefits  in the  technology  policies  and  innovation
strategies  of  nation-states.  At international  levels,  TA has  the  potential  to  enhance  the roles  of  sci-
ence,  technology  and  innovation  towards  achieving  the  Millennium  Development  Goals,  effectively
implementing  the  UN  Framework  on Climate  Change  and  fostering  general  global  transitions  to ‘green
economies’.  However,  when  effectively  recommending  single  ostensibly  ‘best’  technologies  or strategies,
TA practices  can  serve  unjustifiably  to ‘close  down’  debate,  failing  adequately  to address  technical  uncer-
tainties  and  social  ambiguities,  reducing  scope  for democratic  accountability  and  co-ordination  across
scales  and  contexts.  This  paper  investigates  ways  in  which  contrasting  processes  ‘broadening  out’  and
‘opening  up’ TA can  enhance  both  rigour  and  democratic  accountability  in  technology  policy,  as  well as
facilitating  social  relevance  and international  cooperation.  These  methods  allow  TA  to illuminate  options,
uncertainties  and  ambiguities  and  so  inform  wider political  debates  about  how  the  contending  questions,
values  and  knowledges  of  different  social  interests  often  favour  contrasting  innovation  pathways.  In this
way  TA  can  foster  both  technical  robustness  and  social  legitimacy  in subsequent  policy-making.  Drawing
on  three  empirical  case  studies  (at  local,  national  and  international  levels),  the  paper  discusses  detailed
cases  and  methods,  where  recent  TA exercises  have  contributed  to this  ‘broadening  out’  and  ‘opening
up’.  It ends  by  exploring  wider  implications  and challenges  for national  and  international  technology
assessment  processes  that  focus  on  global  sustainable  development  challenges.. Introduction
The World Bank recently estimated that 1.5 billion people were
iving “without sufficient means for human survival” (Chen and
avallion, 2008; Parsons, 2008). Whilst extreme poverty appears
o be falling (United Nations, 2012a,b), gaps dividing rich and
oor continue to widen, both between and within many countries
Milanovic, 2010). Global problems of climate change, biodiver-
ity loss and industrial pollution threaten further to accentuate
he vulnerabilities and inequalities (Rockström et al., 2009). It is
 This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
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eproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
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ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2013.09.004© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
against this background that widespread international recognition
has emerged of the key role that science, technology and innovation
can play in helping foster moves to the kinds of ‘green economy’
discussed at the 2012 Rio + 20 conference (UNEP, 2011; CEC, 2011),
effectively implementing the UN Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change (UNFCCC, 2010), maintaining progress towards the
Millennium Development Goals (UNDP, 2011) and contributing
to a new set of Sustainable Development Goals (United Nations,
2012a,b).
Yet, whilst global annual expenditure on research and devel-
opment continues to grow beyond one trillion dollars (UNESCO,
2010), economic pressures and co-ordination problems in current
systems of governance, mean that only a small proportion of this
investment is directly focussed on such global challenges, even
when investments are directly and explicitly focussed on develop-
ment objectives, their wider long-term efficacy is often in question
(STEPS Centre, 2010). This is because existing efforts in technol-
ogy development and wider innovation are typically most strongly
steered by powerful incumbent interests, which often do not match
reserved.
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hose of the most vulnerable groups, and frequently fail fully to
ccount for social, technical and ecological complexities and uncer-
ainties.
Technology assessment (TA) offers directly to address these
hallenges. As defined here, TA is a broad set of practices aimed
t informing, shaping and prioritising technology policies and
nnovation strategies, by deliberately appraising in advance their
ider social, environmental, and economic implications. TA has
lsewhere been grouped with science and technology foresight
nd policy evaluation as different tools for strategic intelligence
Kuhlmann, 2001). This paper aims to aid understanding of how TA
an address the imperatives discussed above – and explore specific
ays in which its performance might be enhanced. To do this, we
rst describe changing approaches to TA over the past four decades
n particular we outline an approach to characterising TA practices
 distinguishing between the ‘broadening out’ of various kinds of
nputs to TA; and the extent to which TA outputs ‘open up’ wider
olicy debate about alternative innovation pathways.
These terms will be returned to in more detail later. But for now,
broadening out inputs’ involves extending the scope of a TA exer-
ise in a number of dimensions, such as to include in appraisal a
reater variety than might otherwise be considered of problem-
efinitions, technological options, implementing policies, benefits
nd impacts, other relevant issues, uncertainties and ambiguities,
ossibilities and scenarios, values and understandings, as well as
ethods of analysis and deliberation. The more even the atten-
ion to reasonable alternatives in each of these dimensions, the
ore ‘broadened out’ the particular exercise (Stirling, 2006, 2008).
Opening up outputs’, on the other hand, involves not so much
he deliberations and analysis that are internal to a given exercise,
ut the manner in which the eventual findings are communicated
xternally – not only to clients, but also to associated policy mak-
ng debates and wider relevant political discourse. In short, this
nvolves the ‘outputs’ of TA being expressed not as single definitive
results’, but in a more ‘plural and conditional’ fashion with respect
f whatever are the most salient axes of sensitivity that emerge in
ny of the input dimensions. This in turn means highlighting sym-
etrically a number of in-principle, equally valid interpretations
or appropriate ways forward, each with its associated assump-
ions, rationales or contexts (Stirling, 2010).
Next, drawing on evidence from three case studies, we analyse
ow particular aspects of ‘broadening out’ and ‘opening up’ have
llowed some TA-style initiatives focussing on international devel-
pment – either at national or international levels – to overcome
ome of the general shortcomings in existing patterns of innova-
ion noted above. These findings raise significant practical issues
or future TA initiatives, especially as these relate to the harnessing
f science and technology for international development.
. Changing debates around technology assessment across
he OECD
Technology assessment emerged in the 1960s and was first
nstitutionalised in the United States at the Office of Technol-
gy Assessment (OTA) in 1972, and subsequently in several other
ECD countries in the 1970s and 1980s (Van Zwanenberg et al.,
009). These institutions arose partly as a consequence of the fierce
olitical controversies around technologies such as civilian nuclear
nergy. They were seen by proponents as providing an unbiased
nalysis of the impacts of a technology in order to guide public
ecisions about which technologies should or should not be sup-
orted by the State. Brooks argued, for example, that “ideally the
oncept of Technology Assessment is that it should forecast, at least
n a probabilistic basis, the full spectrum of possible consequences
f technological advance, leaving to the political process the actual 43 (2014) 505– 518
choice among the alternative policies in the light of the best available
knowledge of their likely consequences” (Brooks, 1976). Alongside
probabilistic forecasting, a variety of quantitative and qualitative
methods have been applied, including brainstorming, literature
research, document analysis, expert consultation, questionnaires,
case studies, cross impact analysis, cost/benefit analysis, trend
extrapolation, decision trees, Delphi methods, computer simula-
tions, and scenario development (Dylander, 1980; Tran and Daim,
2008).
Since the outset, arguments were made that TA was  not, and
crucially never could be, definitively neutral and objective. Crit-
ics pointed out that assessments were necessarily dependent on
non-technical and often implicit assumptions, especially about the
nature of the problems prompting assessment, the questions to
be asked, the scope of appraisal, the options under consideration,
as well as the appropriate methods to employ and the interpre-
tation of outcomes (Wynne, 1975). These ‘framing’ assumptions
were only rarely explicitly acknowledged in TA as contestable value
judgements that, both shape – and are reinforced by – its out-
comes. In addition, the slow delivery of assessments, the uneven
treatment of social consequences, and limited insights into the
dynamics of socio-technical systems also received criticism (Sclove,
2010). Although the OTA did respond to accusations of lack of social
neutrality by involving particular organised stakeholder groups
(academia, industry and civil society groups), it did not develop
capacities to elicit knowledges and perspectives of wider publics.
Critics argued that the values, outlooks and interests of ‘lay citizens’
were often quite distinct from the understandings and judgements
of organised stakeholders.
Technology assessment declined in the United States after
the OTA was ‘defunded’ by a Republican Congress under the
first Clinton administration in 1995 (Houghton, 1995). However,
the concept briefly attracted high level interest again in 2008
when Congress asked the Government Accountability Office to (re-
)establish a permanent TA capability. US scholars have recently
outlined a number of possible future approaches that could avoid
the criticisms of the US OTA (Rodmeyer et al., 2005; Sclove, 2010;
Guston and Sarewitz, 2002). Yet, despite the US institutional hia-
tus of the 1980s–1990s, active international debate around TA
has been moving forward elsewhere around the world, delivering
a multitude of variant and hybrid methods combining technical
analysis with deliberative processes. Each in several tangible ways
involves either ‘broadening out’ or ‘opening up’ technology assess-
ment procedures, as compared with other extant practice. Just a
few illustrative examples can be mentioned here, to illustrate the
general point.
“Constructive TA”, for instance, can extend attention to issues
that arise around power dynamics in the research and innovation
systems which generate technological particular options rather
than others (Rip et al., 1995). Danish-inspired “participatory TA”
(pTA) has pioneered involvement of politicians, NGOs, trade unions,
journalists, scientists, technology developers and general citizens
in appraisal processes, experimenting with dialogue fora, focus
groups, and consensus conferences to represent the various views
(Klüver et al., 2000). For its part, “interactive TA” was  originally
developed in the Netherlands to help broaden out appreciation not
only of possible response strategies but also of definitions of the
problem at issue – as well as attending to issues of iterative learn-
ing and effective stakeholder comunication within and beyond the
process (Loeber, 2004).
Beyond these, these exist a host of variants and hybrids and com-
plements. “Real-time TA” includes elements of all these approaches,
with particular consideration to issues of timeliness and efficiency
(Guston and Sarewitz, 2002). “Open-source TA” explores a num-
ber of ways in which diverse actors can help design and steer such
processes (Rejeski, 2005). “Integrative participatory TA” (Hirakawa,
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010) addresses these developments in a particular Japanese con-
ext, paying particular attention to the role of technical expertise.
Third generation TA”, again takes elements from several of these
nd seeks to generalise for wider application (Yoshizawa, 2010). In
heir own ways, each of these diverse new approaches all aspire
o allow inclusive participation of stakeholders in what has been
escribed as agenda-building TA (Kuhlmann, 2001). All these meth-
ds, then involve some tangible steps towards ‘broadening out’ and
opening up’ in the senses introduced above.
The implications of these developments are truly global. Con-
ensus conferences in the Danish tradition have been taken up
y many other OECD countries, including in South Korea, Japan
nd Taiwan, where public participation in science and technol-
gy policy-making is gaining ground (Chen and Wu,  2007). China
eems also to be taking more of an interest (Hennen and Ladikas,
009). There is a resurgence of interest in the US (Sclove, 2010).
t is in Europe, however, where development of these contem-
orary forms of TA has generally proceeded furthest and become
ost prominent in wider science and technology policy. Interesting
rogress is being made in several countries towards the institu-
ionalisation of particular approaches, notably in various forms
f national ‘Parliamentary Technology Assessment’ (PTA) (Ladikas
nd Decker, 2004; Ganzevles and Est, 2012). However, divergent
ultural (Hoppe and Grin, 1999) and institutional contexts do
ead to a degree of distinction between emphases contrastingly
n ‘participatory’ methods (pTA) or relations with ‘Parliamentary’
nstitutions and procedures (PTA).
In the case of participatory (p)TA, both locus and focus of
ppraisal are unambiguously society at large in all the broader and
ore open senses discussed above (EUROPTA, 2010). The priority is
ften placed quite explicitly on catalysing public debate (ADAPTA,
000) by illuminating relevant divergent societal views (Pellizzoni,
003), interests and power relations (Ornetzeder and Kastenhofer,
012). This directly addresses the agendas introduced here around
he ‘broadening out’ of inputs to TA and the ‘opening up’ of
utputs.
In the case of the more recently consolidating European tradi-
ion of Parliamentary (P)TA, on the other hand, the focus is to a
reater extent on servicing more specific “clients” (Ganzevles and
st, 2012). Such approaches can show greater affinities with more
arrowly instrumental forms of management-oriented TA (Braun,
998). The entirety of society and political discourse at large can
educe to just one particular “sphere” alongside ‘parliament’, ‘gov-
rnment’ and ‘science and technology’ (Ganzevles and Est, 2012).
he priority of PTA, then can lie more in “building connections of trust
o the parliament and/or making itself useful for MPs” (Ganzevles and
st, 2012). This is approached by regarding various forms of “pol-
cy consultation” (Hennen, 2012) in more institutionally “relational
erms” as means to “facilitate mutual discussions” and “the formation
f political opinion” (Ganzevles and Est, 2012). Whilst not neces-
arily inconsistent, these priorities are quite distinct from agendas
round ‘broadening out’ and ‘opening up’ the practices of partici-
atory TA.
There exist many exceptions and other sources of contextual
iversity at the levels of institutions, organisations and projects
Enzing et al., 2012; Hennen, 2012). These underscore that the
alience of ‘broadening out’ or ‘opening up’ can lie in ostensi-
ly obscure and highly specific features of the circumstances or
ractice of TA. The devil can truly lie in the detail. Despite acknowl-
dging the real progress made in all these traditions, then, there is
cope for questioning whether current high profile, newly insti-
utionalising forms of European TA necessarily always display
ll the claimed properties around broadening out and opening
p discussed above (Pellizzoni, 2003; Stirling, 2008; Abels, 2006;
endriks and Grin, 2006; Bora, 2009; Hoppe, 2010; Ornetzeder and
astenhofer, 2012; Hennen, 2012). 43 (2014) 505– 518 507
The purpose of the following discussion is to provide a further
examination of the rationale for ‘broadening out’ and ‘opening up’,
and to link this especially to the challenges of international devel-
opment and the contexts seen in developing countries. We  then go
on to present three case studies that, we argue, have helped move
TA further beyond some of the more narrow instrumental forms,
involving deep and broadly balanced engagements with public sec-
tor, academic and non-government organisations.
3. From technology assessment to the social appraisal of
pathways to sustainability
While earlier forms of technology assessment focussed on
individual technologies in relatively static contexts, current appre-
ciations of physical, social and political dynamics (Scoones et al.,
2007) call for a more systemic view. Greater recognition is required
of the implications of complexity, uncertainty and divergent values
– and of recent understandings of the social (as well as technical)
dimensions of innovation (Leach et al., 2007). Seen in this way,
TA constitutes one specific set of practices in the wider ‘social
appraisal’ of innovation ‘pathways’ (Stirling et al., 2007). Here,
the term ‘social appraisal’, refers to the array of social processes
through which knowledges are produced and gathered in order
to inform decision making and associated institutional commit-
ments (Stirling, 2008). It is in this way, for instance, that societies
can better appreciate and explore the plurality of alternative pos-
sible ‘pathways to sustainability’ and their associated social and
environmental implications (Leach et al., 2010). ‘Broadening out’
the inputs and ‘opening up’ the outputs of social appraisal – both
within and beyond TA – can address challenges presented by com-
peting perspectives on innovation-related problems and potential
solutions.
4. ‘Broadening out’ technology assessment
It has long been recognised (Nelson and Winter, 1982;
Rosenberg, 1982; Dosi and Nelson, 1994) that the open path-
dependent dynamics of innovation implicate deeper and more
intractable forms of uncertainty than it is possible to address
in the probabilistic approaches of risk assessment advocated in
Brooks’ early characterisation of technology assessment quoted
above. An extensive literature has illuminated contrasting states of
‘uncertainty’ – where probabilities are not known (Knight, 1921;
Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1990); ‘ambiguity’ – where there is dis-
agreement over defining, ordering or interpreting the possibilities
themselves (Stirling, 2003; Jaeger et al., 2001; Dreyer and Renn,
2009) and ‘ignorance’ – where we  don’t know what we don’t know
(Loasby, 1976; Collingridge, 1983; Wynne, 1992; Stirling, 1998).
Each poses more profound challenges for TA than are encompassed
in the mere state of ‘risk’ – which assumes both outcomes and
probabilities can be definitively measured (Morgan and Henrion,
1990; Stirling, 2010). Yet these crucial lessons are often obscured by
the expediently reductive language of risk-based TA, as if all forms
of incomplete knowledge remain equally tractable to risk assess-
ment. By more explicitly appreciating the distinctions between
these contrasting aspects of incomplete knowledge (Stirling, 1998),
roles are revealed for much greater diversities of approaches
in TA.
As attention extends to the complex inter-relationships
between technologies and the social and environmental sys-
tems in which they are embedded, the challenges of incertitude
become more pronounced and the imperatives more pervasive
(Stirling and Scoones, 2009). Instead of “pretence” at defini-
tive ‘risk’ calculation (de Finetti, 1974; von Hayek, 1978), inputs
to TA can be ‘broadened out’ to enhance the knowledge base
5  Policy
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nforming decisions (Stirling et al., 2007). This includes extend-
ng attention to a greater plurality of interdisciplinary and wider
ocietal knowledges (Renn et al., 1995), and considering a wider
rray of alternative technological and non-technological innova-
ions (IPTS, 1999; Gee et al., 2002). Including the knowledges of
iverse stakeholders and local communities – so often ignored
n development-focused TA – can help illuminate, if not reduce,
he otherwise intractable challenges of incertitude (Leach et al.,
010).
Where wider relevant knowledges are already available within
usiness, civil society and other stakeholder networks, then, stake-
older engagement offers not only to increase the robustness of
A, but also to reduce the burdens. This is not only because of
voided costs of foregone ill-advised policies, but because open,
nclusive deliberation can often short-circuit the need for more
xpensive protracted efforts at ‘optimising’ analysis using meth-
ds (like probabilistic analysis) which are by definition incapable
f addressing the intractabilities of uncertainty, ambiguity and
gnorance. Instead, an array of practical TA methods offer more
igorously to address different aspects of ‘incertitude’. Under uncer-
ainty, these include sensitivity analysis, interval analysis and
ecision heuristics (Saltelli et al., 2008). Participatory deliber-
tion, scenario analysis and mapping approaches help address
mbiguity (Stirling et al., 2007). For its part, a state of igno-
ance is in important respects irreducibly indeterminate (Faber
nd Proops, 1994), as well as socially constructed – and even
ometimes increased by further research (Ravetz, 1986). Yet prac-
ices do nonetheless exist for TA that can, conditionally, illuminate
ays to make technology choices more robust in the face of
nevitable surprise (IPTS, 1999; Gee et al., 2002; Stirling, 2012).
hese include the appraisal of qualities in technological systems
ike reversibility, diversity, resilience, adaptability and flexibil-
ty (Stirling, 2012). All these kinds of appraisals can be obscured
nd marginalised by the powerful forces for ‘closing down’ of
A using regulatory techniques like risk assessment (Felt et al.,
007).
But the challenge of power asymmetries in social appraisal
xtend beyond TA methods alone (Wynne, 2002; Jasanoff, 2004;
tirling, 2012). A deeper problem in old models of TA concern the
roader imaginations and associated ‘framing assumptions’ that
ypically underlie institutions as well as analysis. These may  shape,
or instance, the fundamental aims and visions that are enter-
ained about possible futures as well as the issues and questions
hat are held to arise about alternative possible innovation path-
ays. These included the very understandings of what is meant
y ‘justification’, ‘benefit’ or ‘harm’ that underlie the organisa-
ional remits within which TA is undertaken. Crucially, these social
maginations can also constrict appreciation of the diversities of
echnological, organisational and wider cultural alternatives that
re, often invisibly, associated with any particular proposed course
f action. This compounds the tendency for the privileging of tech-
ological solutions in TA, as illustrated for example in the field
f agricultural biotechnology: by market preferences for innova-
ion trajectories that maximise rent on intellectual property or
upply chains (AEBC, 2005) or by the ‘case-by-case’ structuring
f typical regulatory processes under which individual favoured
roducts are assessed not comparatively, but in isolation (OECD,
986).
Here again, those interests which frame the design of TA in
ider processes of social appraisal, can (deliberately or inadver-
ently) predetermine the answers (Mayer and Stirling, 2004). This
akes conventional TA practice particularly vulnerable to instru-
ental (Fiorino, 1989) political pressures for decision justification
Collingridge, 1980) and blame management (Hood, 2002) – often
eading TA to be seen more as a tool for legitimation (Wynne,
975, 2002) than as a means to greater legitimacy (Pellizzoni, 2001; 43 (2014) 505– 518
Stirling, 2006). It is by broadening out TA, then, that we might resist
these perennial instrumental pressures and be more confident that
the results achieve a more substantive reflection of shared public
values and priorities – including those of less affluent, privileged
and powerful groups (NRC, 1996; Stirling, 2008).
5. ‘Opening up’ the outputs of technology assessment
So far, discussion has focused on the ‘inputs’ to technology
assessment – the uncertainties, issues, perspectives and options
that are included in appraisal. Another dimension concerns the out-
puts of TA to policy processes and wider political debates. Rather
than providing a single, ostensibly definitive (objective and com-
prehensive) characterisation of a technology or technology-related
problem (as in old models of TA), an ‘opening up’ approach deliv-
ers a more ‘plural and conditional’ set of outputs – each explicitly
reflecting not only an alternative reasonable result, but also the
associated assumptions, circumstances or perspectives (Stirling,
2008). So, rather than implying a definitively conclusive analysis
(simply saying “we  recommend undertaking option A”), ‘opened
up’ TA instead informs decision makers (and wider political audi-
ences) in a more ‘plural and conditional’ fashion. For instance, it
may  conclude that while some options are unattractive under any
contexts or perspectives, a different subset of options emerge as
equally attractive under particular contexts and perspectives. So,
option B may  be preferable under value judgement X, but option
C under value judgement Y. In this ‘opening up’ mode, then, TA
acknowledges that subjective differences between X and Y are mat-
ters for political attention – and democratic accountability – rather
than technical analysis.
Plural and conditional advice is not a recipe for ‘anything goes’
(Feyerabend, 1978). Crucially, such ‘opening up’ in TA will still high-
light those (typically many) options that appear unconditionally
unfavourable. Indeed, when options are appraised negatively on this
more open basis, the grounds for setting them aside may be judged
correspondingly more robust (reflecting as they do a plurality of
contending conditions, rather than a single privileged perspective).
In this way, procedures for ‘opening up’ the outputs of TA reinforce
the enhanced robustness due to the broadening out of the inputs,
as discussed above. It provides a means at the same time to be
more rigorous about the policy implications of key uncertainties
and ambiguities – and more accountable and democratic about the
particular values that are upheld in decision making (Stirling, 2010).
It is also important to emphasise that orienting TA towards
‘opening up’, is not a recipe for indecisive paralysis. There is no
reason why decisions may  not still be taken and institutional com-
mitments formed in much the same way as in conventional ‘closing
down’ TA. The difference is, that the basis for closure in an opening
up approach, becomes more analytically rigorous (through being
more explicit and systematic about the effects of alternative reason-
able assumptions); and more democratically legitimate (through
enhanced transparency and accountability about the implications
of – and for – divergent values and interests).
Opening up TA can thus help decision-makers and funders by
attending to policy options, issues, uncertainties and perspectives
that would otherwise be marginalised. Although not determin-
ing a specific decision, ‘plural and conditional’ findings can inform
political commitments about which kinds of projects to support
or where to allocate resources. And, although not preventing clear
political decisions, ‘opening up’ TA can usefully highlight the ben-
efits of diversity (Stirling, 2008). In this way, innovation policy can
also gain greater understanding of the ways diversification across
a reasonable variety of favoured options may  hedge against even
the most intractable forms of incertitude discussed above. Diver-
sity in innovation systems also accommodates irreconcilable values
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nd interests (STEPS Centre, 2010), addresses divergent contexts
Stirling, 2007), mitigates lock-in (Arthur, 1994) and can foster
ore fruitful further forms of innovation (Grabher and Stark, 1997;
andau et al., 1996). In all these ways, then, the ‘opening up’ of plural
nd conditional outputs in TA can contribute to more robust deci-
ion making in the face of otherwise insoluble policy challenges.
. Technology assessment in developing country contexts
Technology assessment has been much less common in devel-
ping countries than in OECD member states. This is despite
articularly high profile longstanding recognition that the intro-
uction of technologies into the developing world without
dequate or appropriate prior user engagement, assessment or
oresight has led to low uptake, wasted investments and coun-
erproductive consequences (Châtel, 1979; Chambers et al., 1989;
oonatilake, 1994; Scoones and Thompson, 2009). Where it has
ccurred, TA in developing countries tends to have been largely
echnical in nature, carried out within centralised institutions or
y external consultants in order to direct government or donor
rojects. Attention to the diverse priorities and understandings of
nternational and domestic stakeholders, and citizens (rural and
rban) has rarely been explicit. Relatively recent examples include
he application of cost–benefit analysis to the construction of large
ams (Mehta and Srinivasan, 1999) and the Vision 2020 exercise,
n which the UK’s Department for International Development and
he World Bank supported the government of Andhra Pradesh to
evelop its favoured agriculture and development strategy (includ-
ng an important technological component associated with modern
iotechnologies) (Kuruganti et al., 2008).
The imperative to integrate participatory/deliberative with
xpert/analytic approaches, now commonly recognised in the USA
Fiorino, 1998; NRC, 1996; RCEP, 1998) and Europe (Renn, 1999;
PTS, 1999; Gee et al., 2002) applies no less in developing coun-
ry contexts than it does in industrialised countries. Indeed, there
s probably an even greater gap between life experiences and pri-
rities of poor users and those of scientific and economic experts
n developing country contexts than in industrialised nations
Chambers, 1993). This disjuncture is further exacerbated if TA
s conducted by northern donor organisations or experts without
he involvement of technology users – or even ‘bridging pro-
essionals’, able to relate technical considerations to contexts of
se (STEPS Centre, 2010). In addition, the heterogeneity of con-
exts in some developing countries means that even the same
echnology can be configured and experienced in very different
ays.
The kind of ‘narrowness’ in the social appraisal of innovation
escribed above can be especially problematic in lower income
ountries. Here – despite strenuous and inspiring efforts – limited
overnance capacities mean that asymmetries of power, privilege
nd vulnerability often remain more acute. In particular, prob-
ems of destitution compound exclusion of particular communities
rom markets. Chronic barriers to access to education and politi-
al representation can aggravate the marginalisation of interests.
hese predicaments all strongly amplify the rationale for ‘broad-
ning out’ TA in all the ways discussed here. Although not offering
anaceas, many of the methods for ‘broadening out’, mentioned
bove, can help reinforce wider institutional reforms to help extend
he range of alternative options and perspectives engaged as inputs
o TA – and so help mitigate the ubiquitously distorting effects of
rivilege and power. These often harness participatory approaches
Chambers, 1994) to attempt to avoid earlier wasted domestic
nd external expenditure on technologies for development, by
esigning more culturally compatible technologies, like partici-
atory plant breeding. However – beyond dispersed and isolated 43 (2014) 505– 518 509
experiments – mechanisms for meaningfully involving user and
wider stakeholders in TA activities have yet to materialise in devel-
opment settings.
This does not mean that the importance of broadening out the
options, perspectives, knowledges and values included in TA is
not as recognised in southern settings as it is in the global north.
Limited numbers of participatory TA activities associated with
emerging technologies and other potential solutions to develop-
ment challenges have taken place in low income countries. Interest
has increased since the 1990s in participatory, ‘deliberative and
inclusionary processes’ (DIPs) in areas like the potential role of
genetically modified crops in food or fibre production (Wakeford,
2001, 2004). For example, a citizens’ jury on genetically modi-
fied organisms (GMOs) in Karnataka, India, delivered a verdict that
questioned the effectiveness of Bt cotton in responding to the chal-
lenges of poor farmers and raised concerns around environmental
sustainability and put forward various alternatives (ActionAid,
2000). Citizens’ juries on agricultural biotechnology have since
been facilitated in Mali (IIED, 2007), Zimbabwe (Rusike, 2003), and
Brazil (Toni and Von Braun, 2001).
7. Technology assessment at international levels
Discussions around international TA for development have a
long history, dating back to mandate from the UN General Assem-
bly, in Resolution 34/218, for the Intergovernmental Committee on
Science and Technology to:
“initiate arrangements for the early identification and assess-
ment of new scientific and technological developments which
may  adversely affect the development process as well as those
which may  have specific and potential importance for that
process and for strengthening the scientific and technologi-
cal capacities of the developing countries” (United Nations,
1979).
However, political and technological realities in the 1970s did
not, and could not, allow international participation in such assess-
ments. At more geographically bounded scales (as mentioned
above) this proved easier (Enzing et al., 2012). Within the Euro-
pean Union, the STRATA (Strategic Analysis of Specific Political
Issues) and STOA (Science and Technology Options Assessment)
programmes have attempted to combine efforts across nation
states, and work within the OECD has to some extent extended this
further through its ‘International Futures Programme’ (which has
focussed on global challenges such as future global shocks) (OECD,
2009).
Diversifying sources of innovation, largely outside these estab-
lished centres (Ely and Scoones, 2009) and the ever-growing
pervasiveness of new technologies and their impacts heighten the
need for international co-ordination in democratic technology gov-
ernance. International, networked approaches could also provide
important inputs to international research networks collaborating
on development challenges and thus building the innovation sys-
tem linkages and efficacy of what Wagner (2008) terms the ‘New
Invisible College’ of scientists collaborating internationally towards
shared development aims. These issues again lead us again to iden-
tify a vital need for international technology assessment. Despite
this need, however, existing policy structures and limits to the
accountability of intergovernmental organisations raise continu-
ing questions about the legitimacy and viability of associated TA
institutions (Van Zwanenberg et al., 2009). The following section
begins to outline examples where these challenges have begun
to be addressed by explicit attempts to broaden out and open up
technology assessments for development, especially at the inter-
national level.
5  Policy
8
t
t
w
t
K
a
p
a
t
n
o
‘
o
r
r
p
g
w
t
t
p
i
d
d
i
i
w
c
fi
o
t
p
y
i
i
c
d
e
m
c
s
b
a
9
9
K
e
i
R
i
a
o
m
p
f
i
i10 A. Ely et al. / Research
. A case study approach to investigating the opening up of
echnology assessments
This paper now focuses in detail on three case studies (respec-
ively) in areas of agriculture strategy, emerging technologies for
ater provision and innovation in crop production. These are:
he intergovernmental International Assessment of Agricultural
nowledge, Science and Technology for Development (IAASTD);
 set of NGO initiatives to explore options for potable water
rovision in Zimbabwe, Peru and Nepal; and a researcher-led
ppraisal of agricultural innovation pathways in Kenya. Each of
hese examples was co-ordinated by non-traditional actors (i.e.,
ot national-level technology assessment offices). Each focussed
n ‘problems’ rather than individual technologies (as prospective
solutions’). And each delivered more open ‘plural and conditional’
utputs to policy. The three case studies have been selected to
epresent a diversity of: scales (both timeframes and geographical
each); cost (ranging between $15,000 and $15 million); partici-
ants (variously highlighting private, public, non-government and
overnment sectors); and domains of interest (agriculture and
ater/health). The methods employed further illuminate impor-
ant diversities. Given the paucity of data in this area (linked
o the relatively small number of TA processes that have taken
lace in developing countries), a targeted case study of this kind
s the only way empirically to gauge the potential – and con-
itions – for TA to best contribute to equitable international
evelopment.
In each case, we evaluate the extent to which the exercise
n question can be seen to exemplify the kinds of ‘broaden-
ng out’ and ‘opening up’ described above, the mechanisms by
hich this was achieved, and the associated implications. Of
ourse, the short time lapse (and many complexities) make it dif-
cult to determine the impacts of these real world TA exercises
n the actual innovation pathways they examined. An evalua-
ive focus is therefore better directed at the more immediate
olicy consequences. Here, discussion is based on in-depth anal-
sis of the individual TAs, wider documentary evidence and
nterviews with actors involved. This methodological pluralism
s required to assemble a holistic and robust analysis in each
ase. But it still encounters several challenges. Documentary evi-
ence (especially policy publications) has particular limitations:
ven where TA serves to alter policies or technologies, decision-
akers may  not officially acknowledge this. And absence of
ounterfactuals raises further significant challenges for conclu-
ions about relative impacts. As a result, an interpretive approach
ased on multiple data sources offers the best methodological
pproach.
. Case study details
.1. Case study 1; the International Assessment of Agricultural
nowledge, Science and Technology for Development
The International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Sci-
nce and Technology for Development (IAASTD) was a joint
nitiative of the World Bank, UNDP, FAO, and other institutions.
unning ran between 2003 and 2008, its aim was “to assess the
mpacts of past, present and future agricultural knowledge, science
nd technology on the reduction of hunger and poverty, improvement
f rural livelihoods and human health, and equitable, socially, environ-
entally and economically sustainable development” (IAASTD, 2009,
. vi). The resulting five regional reports and one global report, took
our years to produce and cost some $15 million. It was  global
n scope and networked – in the sense that it involved multiple
nstitutions in public, civil, and private sectors. This included some 43 (2014) 505– 518
900 people across 110 countries in a multi-stakeholder process
involving business, civil society and policy-makers (if not wider
citizen participation). The intention was that the results would pro-
vide a global consensus for investing in agricultural science and
technology, setting priorities for both national and global organi-
sations.
9.2. Case study 2; exploring the role of new technologies in clean
water provision through stakeholder events in Zimbabwe, Peru
and Nepal
“Nanotechnology” is usefully defined in a key British Royal
Society report as “the design, characterisation, production and
application of structures, devices and systems by controlling shape
and size at nanometre scale” (Royal Society, 2004). This includes
many new techniques and applications with potentials to drive per-
vasive changes in society and its interactions with nature. Although
put forward by some as a key component of the new ‘green econ-
omy’ (Lux Research, 2010), other commentators have pointed to
the potential for negative impacts on communities and ecosystems,
including in developing countries (Arnall, 2003). The Royal Soci-
ety report emphasised: “It may also be important to look beyond the
perspective of Western industrialised societies, to take account of the
ways in which people in developing societies might respond to develop-
ments in nanotechnologies and their impacts” (Royal Society, 2004).
In a rare example of nanotechnology-focussed TA-type activities
in ‘developing’ countries, the international NGO Practical Action
joined with other stakeholders to undertake the ‘Nanodialogue’ ini-
tiative in Zimbabwe and a range of related activities in Peru and
Nepal.
The Zimbabwe event unfolded over three days in 2006, when
UK researchers from the think-tank DEMOS and the University
of Lancaster, gathered in Harare with Practical Action and local
stakeholders, scientists and citizens from two communities in
Zimbabwe, to investigate the general challenge of clean water pro-
vision (Grimshaw et al., 2007; Stilgoe, 2007; Mellado, 2010).
As part of a larger, UK government-supported programme of
‘Nanodialogues’, the process was  organised around the question
“can nanotechnologies help achieve the millennium develop-
ment target of halving the number of people without access
to clean water by 2015?” However, the Zimbabwe dialogue
focussed on identifying and understanding various sources of
problems in water provision, as well as discussing a num-
ber of potential technological and non-technological solutions,
with nanotechnologies included as just one option among many.
By directly involving communities in a participatory process –
and addressing not only technological, but also cultural and
political issues in discussion – the Zimbabwe Nanodialogue
broadened out both technical and nontechnical inputs to the
process and also delivered a number of general recommenda-
tions to government and non-government actors, nationally and
internationally.
The stakeholder workshop approach illustrated by the
Zimbabwe Nanodialogue was also used in similar exercises
co-ordinated by Practical Action to investigate potable water
provision in Peru and Nepal. The emphasis at a seminar (November
2007) and workshop (April 2008) in Peru was  on focused on
key problems around mercury pollution from small mines in the
Andes. These exercises gathered a wide variety of actors together
and led to the establishment of a Spanish language website and
network across the Andean region and ongoing links with nano-
technology researchers in the UK. Another event in May  2009 in
Kathmandu, Nepal, focussed on developing a design brief for an
arsenic sensing device for use among contaminated areas of South
Asia.
 Policy
9
K
o
m
w
i
D
w
n
d
w
l
o
t
M
b
a
t
e
w
t
a
i
t
I
p
a
v
e
o
1
t
i
p
p
t
d
1
1
m
m
t
m
t
c
p
T
c
c
d
d
s
i
o
aA. Ely et al. / Research
.3. Case study 3: multicriteria mapping of farming innovation in
enya
Climate change and variability pose new challenges for devel-
pment. In 2008, a UK Research Council-supported project took
aize-based farming strategies in Kenya as a starting point from
hich to examine different types of innovation proposed by var-
ous actors in response to climate change (Brooks et al., 2009).
iscussions with farmers, plant breeders, policy-makers, extension
orkers and executives in commercial seed companies identified
ine distinct ‘innovation pathways’. The idea was to open up the
ebate about alternative responses to environmental change, both
ithin maize agriculture (including high input/low input and pub-
ic/private options) and out of maize, to other crop-based livelihood
ptions.
A novel aspect of the project was the use of an investigative
ool called multicriteria mapping (MCM:  Stirling and Mayer, 2001).
CM  is a hybrid quantitative–qualitative elicitation tool that can
e used in interviews or group settings to appraise an open-ended
rray of different options and associated issues and uncertainties. In
his particular exercise, a broad cross-section of stakeholders were
ach asked to evaluate nine core ‘innovation pathways’ (options), as
ell as any others they wished to add. Crucially, MCM  prompts par-
icipants to characterise their own criteria for evaluating options –
nd elicits detailed technical ‘scores’ under each.
A further unusual feature of MCM  is that it does not just ask
nterviewees to assign a single score for each option under each cri-
erion. Instead, it elicits two scores: one optimistic, one pessimistic.
n each case, care is taken to document the reasoning. As partici-
ants iteratively assess all options under all criteria, the software
ggregates scores and uncertainties and presents these in easily
isualised ways. A specialised analysis tool allows comprehensive
xploration of the ambiguities and uncertainties and implications
f different perspectives.
0. Evidence from the case studies
We  now provide a brief review of our case studies, focusing on
he extent to which and the ways in which they ‘broadened out’
nputs to technology assessment (in terms of methods, disciplines,
erspectives, issues and options) and ‘opened up’ outputs to wider
olicy debate. We  also discuss the challenges and implications of
hese shifts for the nature of the TA process and subsequent policy
ecision-making.
0.1. How were the inputs to the assessment broadened out?
0.1.1. Broadening participation and options through a
ulti-stakeholder process – the IAASTD
Right from the outset, the IAASTD was intended to be much
ore inclusive and participatory, in both design and process, than
raditional global expert assessments. A networked, international
ulti-stakeholder steering committee established the scope – and
he processes and procedures by which the exercise would be
onducted and governed – following consultation with over 800
articipants from diverse sectors and locations (Scoones, 2009).
he assessment was overseen by a multi-stakeholder bureau –
omprising representatives from government, private sector and
ivil society. The bureau selected 400 scientists (from a range of
isciplines and institutional settings) to author the report. The
rafts were subjected to two independent peer reviews by asses-
ors from government, civil society, industry and specialist research
nstitutes. There was no direct representation of farmers or their
rganisations (either in early consultation stages or subsequently)
nd limited funds meant it was not always possible for report 43 (2014) 505– 518 511
authors to consult, as they had been encouraged to do. Some
commentators regarded this as a fundamental design flaw, under-
mining the legitimacy of the effort as a whole. Others saw it as
a necessary consequence of convening such an international pro-
cess, but one which allowed space for (indirect) representation of
farmers by NGOs and other civil society organisations.
The inclusion such geographically and sectorally diverse actors
had several important consequences. First, it meant that many
often-excluded perspectives were voiced – on occasion finding
their way into the overall report. As one participant noted: “per-
haps for the first time, those advocating sustainable agriculture and
indigenous knowledge had been given a place at the table, and got
(some of) their views acknowledged”  (Scoones, 2009). Second, it
allowed a range of viewpoints, perspectives, arguments, assump-
tions and types of evidence to be brought together in one place.
This produced frequent tension, especially between traditional
production-oriented analyses and perspectives emphasising envi-
ronmental, social and political issues and the multi-functionality
of agriculture. This was  considered by some commentators as
unhelpful, resulting in an assessment biased against modern
biotechnologies (Wager, 2008), but for others it was the result
of effective inclusion, where controversies were dealt with and
compromise sought (IFOAM, 2008). One of the key findings of the
IAASTD is that there are diverse and conflicting interpretations of
the past and current role of agricultural science and technology
in development, which need to be acknowledged and respected
(IAASTD, 2009).
The scope of IAASTD extended well beyond agricultural science
and technology with a decision by the steering committee that
the assessment should encompass not only scientifically validated
studies but also other types of relevant knowledge (e.g., knowl-
edge held by agricultural producers, consumers and end users)
and that it should also assess the role of institutions, organisa-
tions, governance, markets and trade. One consequence of this
multi-dimensional scope of IAASTD, was that the options under
consideration became correspondingly more ambitious and wide
ranging. Attention stretched to include issues such as: the sys-
tem of agricultural subsidies in OECD countries; trade rules and
intellectual property law; and traditional and local knowledge
in community-based innovation. For some, this was too broad:
“. . .if you propose everything, then you don’t prioritise anything”
observed one commentator (Coghlan, 2008). Others suggested that
the publication of iconoclastic ideas is itself a triumph. An IAASTD
spokeswoman argued that “even changing perceptions of farming is
quite a shift from the past 50 years, and they should drive the agenda for
the next 50” (Coghlan, 2008). Either way, this ambition and breadth
in the IAASTD managed to stimulate debates in diverse circles, from
community groups working on agriculture and development to dis-
cussions at the G8 (Scoones, 2008). Debates about issues such as
unequal access to food, water and agricultural opportunity have, as
a result, been brought further to the foreground of policy debate.
The IAASTD has now set a precedent in terms of, for example, inclu-
siveness, and deliberation over scope, which is reflected in the way
future global assessments will now be conducted (e.g., Foresight,
2011).
10.1.2. Broadening participation and options for consideration in
the Zimbabwe Nanodialogue
The Zimbabwe stakeholder workshop attempted deliberately
and directly to ‘broaden out’ the inputs to the debate. Academics
from the Zimbabwean Academy of Sciences, the UK and South
African universities were joined by policy makers from several Zim-
babwean Ministries and many other public agencies. The process
also included members of two different citizen communities, cru-
cially differentiating perspectives, rather than seeing ‘users’ as a
uniform group. This enabled attention to be paid to a diversity
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f contexts in which nanotechnologies might be employed – with
ssues such as control and ownership put forward as key issues for
onsideration in ways that might otherwise have been neglected.
t also illustrated some of the problems with previous technology-
ased solutions, allowing scientists and policy makers to attend to
he ways in which nanofilters might fit with the practical challenges
aced by poor communities. The community members’ responses
o previous technologies and the difficulties these raised presented
elling insights. For instance, issues emerged around availability of
arts or expertise for maintenance and repair, leading to unwel-
ome dependencies on NGOs. This inclusive approach also allowed
ross-interrogation of community and scientific responses to
ther key challenges, illuminating otherwise-implicit assumptions
nd highlighting alternative strategies. For example, community
embers highlighted access issues as the main hindrances to
ocial uptake of new water-related technologies, whilst scientists
ointed more to community empowerment and involvement in
he development process. Organisers concluded that inclusion of
olicy-makers and other innovation system actors at the workshop
ed to greater improved understanding and capacity than would
ave been the case for a less participatory TA exercise (Gudza,
010).
The Zimbabwe Nanodialogue was not focused on a technology
er se, but around the general challenge of potable water provi-
ion (Gudza, 2010). It devoted a whole day towards exploring the
road underlying problems, as seen from diverse perspectives. This
roadening out of the range of options considered meant that the
xercise was not limited to particular technologies like nanofil-
ers, but also involved wider innovations and practices, including
ells, rope and washer/treadle pumps, chemical treatment, boil-
ng water, eco-san, sand abstraction, water divining. Broadening
ut the inputs to the other Practical Action initiatives in Peru and
epal also yielded benefits. The Nepal event involved a greater
iversity of perspectives and raised a number of issues that would
ave been overlooked under conventional TA (Grimshaw, 2011a).
hese included many human aspects associated with the con-
exts in which the technologies would be used, including data
anagement challenges, capabilities required by local users, cul-
ural issues with the marking of wells, trust amongst different
roups and availability of maintenance support. Examination of
ontext-specific technical specifications took user perspectives into
ccount, including preferences for numeric rather than colour-
oded displays amongst villagers, required degrees of accuracy and
perating temperatures (Grimshaw, 2009). The initiative in Peru
nformed a later international collaboration to design and test a
iosensor for arsenic, again involving expert and lay participants in
he development process (Grimshaw, 2011b). This will build fur-
her inclusion of local users of the technology, in a region where
ore than a million people are at risk from arsenic contamination
UNICEF, 2006).
0.1.3. Broadening the mapping of Kenyan agricultural
nnovation pathways: the MCM  method
Multicriteria mapping (MCM)  is designed to explore practical
olicy implications of different stakeholder perspectives. In this
enyan MCM,  a range of potential agricultural innovation pathways
ere initially defined through discussions with stakeholder groups,
ho were then invited to assess each on the basis of their own cho-
en criteria. Alongside the focal issue of enhanced innovation in
aize, this illuminated a range of different ways in which different
roups: focused on contrasting problems; highlighted contending
esponses; defined distinct kinds and distributions of benefit and
mpacts; introduced different uncertainties and – whilst sharing
reas of agreement – arrived at disparate conclusions concerning
he merits of alternative innovation pathways. 43 (2014) 505– 518
It is unlikely that a top-down, expert led TA would have resolved
such a broadly balanced array of options. The ways participants
defined and prioritised the impacts of different pathways were also
rather different than might be expected from an expert-based pro-
cess, because they involved more explicit value judgements. As a
consequence of this breadth and sensitivity to divergent perspec-
tives, the Kenyan MCM  produced a range of interesting, and even
counter-intuitive, findings. For example, quite different groups of
stakeholders – maize farmers, the biotechnology industry, and pub-
lic sector researchers – all held in common a relatively optimistic
view of alternative dryland crops as a response to climate change,
as compared with other options such as commercial, public sector
or locally driven improvement of maize varieties.
All the above cases show how a range of tools and approaches
can enable broader stakeholder and/or citizen deliberation over key
value-laden aspects of TA. Without this, crucial questions might
otherwise be neglected, such as: the nature of the focal problems;
the choice of appropriate responses; the prioritisation of alterna-
tive issues and the relevance of different perspectives. In some
cases (e.g., IAASTD) outputs of such deliberations informed more
traditional analytical expert-based assessment. In others (e.g., Nan-
odialogue and MCM)  the assessment as a whole was  conducted by
particular stakeholders and citizen actors.
10.2. Opening up the outputs from technology assessment
This section discusses how and to what extent each case study
involved an ‘opening up’ of the outputs of technology assessment
– such that a number of viable options were communicated sym-
metrically to decision-makers. Also discussed, will be the degree
to which the different TA methods are conducive to concise, mean-
ingful and efficient communication of ‘opened up’ outputs to policy
debates.
10.2.1. The challenge of opening up outputs in the IAASTD
The IAASTD process struggled to reconcile two  commitments.
On one hand, was  a desire to encourage a plural and inclusive
process that genuinely engaged with political and evaluative – as
well as technical – issues and which broadened debates around
agricultural science and technology. On the other hand, was an
expectation that uncertainties could be resolved by a rational,
objective, scientific debate among expert peers, leading to com-
mon  understandings and consensus visions for the future (Scoones,
2009). To some extent, this tension was managed through infor-
mal  debate and argument rather than allowing different political
and value positions to be explicitly acknowledged. The IAASTD did
seek to identify where there was consensus and where there was
uncertainty, and to discuss minority points of view. Furthermore, it
did not make unitary recommendations, only a series of options for
action at the global level and each of the regional levels, on the basis
that different stakeholders who  might wish to act on those options
have different sets of priorities and responsibilities, and operate in
different socioeconomic and political circumstances.
On particularly contentious issues, such as the potential utility of
genetically modified (GM) crops, consensus was unobtainable and
recalcitrant differences of opinion led to withdrawal of some pri-
vate sector participants (Nature, 2008). Such antagonistic dynamics
are not necessarily without value. As in wider political mobil-
isations, such technology controversies can in themselves help
catalyse and shape further knowledge production (Felt et al., 2007)
and so be thought of as an informal contribution to TA (Rip, 1986).
However, the IAASTD did not explore the worldviews and per-
spectives that underlay this polarisation. As a consequence, the
opportunity was  not fully seized, to produce a balanced and sys-
tematic picture of the particular kinds of reasoning behind the hotly
contending positions on GM and its alternatives.
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In Johannesburg in April 2008, the IAASTD held an intergov-
rnmental Plenary Meeting to ratify final reports. There was no
bligation on governments or others to act on the outputs of the one
lobal and five sub-global reports (Coghlan, 2008). It is thus difficult
o ascertain any concrete impacts on funding of agricultural inno-
ation. However, a resulting recognition of the multi-functionality
f agriculture has been maintained in subsequent internationally
ited UK reports in the same area (e.g., Foresight, 2011) and the
irector of the IAASTD has claimed that some of the assessment’s
rocesses are even being embraced by one of the sponsors (the
orld Bank) that was previously sceptical to its agenda.
0.2.2. Opening up policy discussions in the Zimbabwe
anodialogue
Despite being named a ‘Nanodialogue’, the TA focused on diverse
olicy responses to water challenges, looking well beyond nano-
echnology. Indeed, the shared finding emerged after the first two
ays that “there is no real water quality issue that cannot be solved
ith existing technologies” is itself an illustration of a kind of open-
ng up that would be impossible under a more singular focus on
 particular technology. However, the final outputs of the Nan-
dialogue were not limited to this consensus. Discussions raised
 large number of further questions, including those targeted at
cientists about the possibility of using nanotechnologies in com-
ination with other options, as well as the timeframes and specific
onditions under which these might be favourable. In this way, this
xercise helped frame and put in context any future expert focus
ore traditionally on nanotechnologies and their conditions of
cceptance – illustrating in the process possible organisational syn-
rgies between inclusion and expertise and how participation can
elp frame expert deliberation. The inclusion in the report of unre-
olved questions, ambiguities and uncertainties, alongside more
pecific findings and recommendations, also provided an open basis
or future societal discussion. This may  not have helped bring about
irect policy change. Investment was in any case precluded by
he context. But the process highlighted the complexities of, and
lternatives to, the focal set of new technologies.
0.2.3. Opening up outputs in the Kenyan multicriteria mapping
MCM  does not only allow respondents to identify alternative
ptions, choose whatever criteria are wish, freely weigh their
mportance and express a range of uncertainties – it also directly
onveys the implications of this broader scope in the published
A results. MCM  therefore emphasises the salient dimensions of
iversity across different perspectives, rather than artificially com-
ining these into a single picture, or ‘best’ option. In principle, then,
CM should help decision-makers better appreciate the range of
vailable choices, we well as different actors’ preferences and their
ssociated reasons. As with any specialist method, the utility of this
ool relies on training and capacity. However, these upfront invest-
ents are quire transferable and – through features like codified
rocedures and visual representations – themselves help convey
he implications of opening up.
In the Kenyan MCM,  nine distinct innovation pathways were
dentified that farmers in semi-arid regions of Kenya might pur-
ue in response to climate change. These ranged from reliance on
aize as the key crop to diversification out of maize; and from
eliance on internal inputs to external inputs. The pathways were
ssessed in group interviews, gathering separately men  and women
nd higher and lower income farmers, as well as a range of different
inds of stakeholders. 147 criteria were defined by informants to
valuate the pathways. These ranged from economic issues such as
esource costs, market access and availability, through stress tol-
rance, water use and pest and disease resistance, to wider social,
olitical and cultural issues such as food security and the avail-
bility of knowledge and skills. Respondents scored each pathway 43 (2014) 505– 518 513
using their own definitions of relevant criteria, rating both opti-
mistic and pessimistic scores and ordering criteria in their own
sequence of importance.
As an example, Fig. 1 shows the weighted optimistic and pes-
simistic scores for all the pathways, according to the contrasting
criteria and uncertainties expressed by different income and high
income subsets of Sakai farmers. The horizontal axis is an ascend-
ing scale of performance, with each horizontal bar showing the
uncertainty associated with each pathway under each perspec-
tive. Among other things, the figure illustrates that both high and
low income sub-groups favoured locally improved seed over the
dominant option of new maize seed delivered by the public or com-
mercial sectors. But a number of potentially significant contrasts in
perspective are also evident (discussed further in Thompson et al.,
2011).
As illustrated in the above summaries, there exists a range of
techniques than enable the opening up of outputs, ranging from
quite specific tools like MCM  to simply a commitment to represent
diverse views and the extent of consensus and its absence, through
an explicit discussion of unresolved uncertainties, conditionalities,
unaddressed questions, and finally options for subsequent debate,
as in the IAASTD and Nanodialogues exercises. Although there may
be issues about reliably representing such diversity, and represent-
ing it in a form that is useful for policy-makers and other audiences,
perhaps the principal challenge is not with conducting the TA exer-
cises in this way, but with how they are subsequently viewed by
decision-makers and other actors. Thus, the problem with the issue
of biotechnology in the IAASTD was not the explicit differences of
opinion on the role of genetic modification in agricultural devel-
opment, but the unwillingness of some stakeholders to recognise
this as a legitimate and accurate representation of opinion on that
issue.
11. Lessons for broad and open models of technology
assessment for international development challenges
Based on the evidence presented above, what implications arise
for new TA institutions – especially those focussing on inter-
national development challenges with a global dimension? How
can broadened-out and opened up approaches remain useful and
enlightening for policy, and what are the challenges involved?
This section addresses these questions and ends by discussing
their implications for better-co-ordinated and more democratically
legitimate international technology assessments.
11.1. Implications and challenges of broadening out
The tendency towards ‘broadening out’ has been seen in both
pTA and – to a more variable extent – PTA in the European Union,
has not been studied in developing countries or more broadly. Our
cases illustrate a number of advantages of this wider deliberation
over value-laden aspects of TA. First and foremost, problem defini-
tions and potential options that are important to user communities
were identified that might otherwise have been overlooked in a
more traditional TA exercise. Similarly, the IIASTD finding that
there are diverse and conflicting interpretations of the role of agri-
cultural science and technology in development that need to be
respected is also an important, perhaps underappreciated step
towards a more mature, democratic debate about this important
topic. More instrumental advantages included the identification
of potentially overlooked innovation pathways in the Kenyan
maize MCM  exercise on which there was  nevertheless consider-
able consensus across stakeholder groups as to their relative merits;
and, in the Nanodialogue exercises, the identification of practical
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roblems, such as user capabilities and dependence on outsiders
or spare parts and expertise.
Nevertheless, technology assessment continues to encounter a
umber of challenges as it attempts to ‘broaden out’ the perspec-
ives sought and the options addressed. Firstly, challenges exist
or broadening out in the design of TA activities – selecting the
takeholders and representatives to be included in the initial fram-
ng of the process. The IAASTD and other trans-national efforts
not directly related to technology) such as the Worldwide Views
n Global Warming initiative illustrate how participation of not
nly stakeholders but also civil society and members of the pub-
ic has recently been extended to a truly global level, however
hese successes must be acknowledged to have required signifi-
ant financial resources and capacity for international engagement
nd networking across the relevant TA institutions. The case stud-
es also provide similar lessons at the national level. As illustrated
y Van Zwanenberg and Arza (2013), technologies can be subject
o different configurations (and contribute to different pathways
f change), even in different contexts at the national scale. Some
f these constituencies are especially marginalised, or may  even
imply be absent in domestic democratic fora. At the national level
nd below, the Nanodialogues and MCM  cases recognised these
hallenges by including representatives of urban and rural commu-
ities, and farmers of different income levels, respectively. These
rocesses showed that including users and lay inputs was perhaps
ost instructive at the point of problem-framing. After this, techni-
al expertise was drawn on as required within the context of these
roadened considerations and led to further research and develop-
ent (with continued user input) and other interventions. The fact
hat these were dependent on external funding rather than being
riven by the governments of the countries in which the initial TA
ctivities had taken place is a weakness but also indicative of the
omplex politics at play in allocating scarce domestic resources to
hese kinds of initiatives. Experience and appropriate capabilities
re sometimes also lacking.
However, challenges extend beyond identifying the breadth of
ctors to engage at the outset of the TA process, to ensuring that
he broad range of participants recognised the utility and validity
f the exercise. As noted above, at least some ended up viewing
he IAASTD as too broad in scope to be useful. Another challenge
as to ensure that participants continued to recognise the valid-
ty of the exercise (necessary for their continued participation andnine pathways against economic and market criteria (Thompson et al., 2011).
thus the legitimacy of the process). This was  especially so where
broader kinds of knowledge and perspectives were brought to bear
on expert assessments, or where such assessments responded to
a more complex set of questions and issues as a result of prior
processes of deliberation on issues of scope. Again, in the IAASTD,
at least some participants considered the end result overly biased
against biotechnology, given the plurality of expert and stakeholder
perspectives on the purpose of agriculture (prompting some to exit
the process in protest). Such tensions are probably unavoidable
(although they may  be mitigated by a commitment to opening up
the outputs of TA) but the challenge is to diminish their extent
and impact without compromising on ambitions to operate in an
inclusive, participatory manner.
The case studies also illustrate the practical constraints to broad-
ening out processes of technology assessment itself. IAASTD may
have involved a more diverse set of participants than previous
efforts, but extending this ‘broadening out’ in an attempt to do
justice to the diversity of agro-ecological contexts at play would
be impractical and unaffordable (even if employing modern infor-
mation and communication technologies as proposed by Sclove
(2010), Wilson and Casey (2008), and Talyarkhan et al. (2004)).
At the same time, coordination of progressively broader processes
threatens a bureaucracy that might undermine this diversity with
stifling logistical demands. Extending internationally the moves
towards more inclusive processes that have been seen in Europe
will thus require new institutional innovations. This is especially
so if the inclusion of plural inputs and options is to take place in a
systematic way that allows cumulative knowledge generation and
policy-useful outputs, without over-bureaucratisation.
11.2. Implications and challenges of opening up TA for
international development
The case studies also indicate the benefits, as well as challenges,
of opening up the outputs of technology assessment at both the
international level and at more local scales.
The IAASTD’s plural outputs recognised the multifunctionality of
agriculture and the different values associated with potential out-
comes across the globe. It catalysed a shift in debates – most notably
providing a key resource for civil society but increasingly being
recognised by government and donor organisations. Rather than
providing a blueprint for international efforts, it acknowledged
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he uncertainties and ambiguities at play and laid bare the con-
roversies that previous multilateral reports often failed to engage
ith. However, for this, it received significant criticism. The pres-
ure to close down on specific technological solutions (for example
y including a chapter devoted to a “Focus on Transgenics”) was
videnced by exit by participants and critique from funders (Nature
iotechnology, 2008). In resisting this pressure, the IAASTD avoided
eing instrumentalised in the service of one particular technology
nd instead set the scene for a more open social appraisal of poten-
ial innovation pathways (including the social conditions under
hich they might flourish).
As well as extending participation to include technology users,
he second and third case studies are also compatible with meth-
ds of ‘opening up’ that seek to deliver more ‘plural and conditional’
utputs – relating conclusions to assumptions (and especially ques-
ioning expert assumptions regarding the suitability of certain
ptions). One challenge is presenting this kind of output in an
asily accessible and clear format. The MCM  exercise in particular
nables communication of these outputs in an efficient way. Whilst
he accessibility of these outputs to policy makers requires further
nvestigation, this tool does present a scalable approach to eliciting
nd comparing perspectives in international, networked forms of
A.
Another challenge (potentially levelled at all three cases) might
ave been said to have been the absence of a clear policy solution.
hilst this might have been seen as a weakness of these particu-
ar cases, they in fact recognised the opportunities, as well as the
ifficulties and constraints associated with each and every option
ppraised, providing a full and robust input to subsequent policy-
aking, which can itself be seen as a strength. ‘Closing down’ to
 circumscribed set of options is not the role of TA. Instead, such
ommitments are the domain of politically accountable decision-
akers, and if TA is to contribute to the democratisation of
echnology governance, rather than succumb to instrumentalisa-
ion by powerful groups, its role should be to resist processes of
closing down’.
Thus, rather than necessarily delivering definitive policy advice,
road and open approaches to TA also enable the inclusion of
ctors directly engaged in knowledge production or develop-
ent of new technologies and practices, offering a means to
wire up’ an innovation system, as Martin and Johnston argue
ith respect to technology foresight (1999). This strengthens con-
ections between actors and institutions involved in innovation
rocesses (e.g., private firms, public sector research centres, users,
unders, decision-makers) allowing knowledges to flow more freely
etween diverse actors, and learning to pervades more readily
cross social barriers.
Networked approaches (for example those convened by Prac-
ical Action) delivered diverse but inter-articulating outputs (both
n terms of needs and resources) in different parts of the world.
here are significant challenges in linking up these relatively iso-
ated initiatives across institutions to provide plural, but at the same
ime coherent and cumulative bodies of knowledge. In this case
o-ordination is required to ensure that various technology assess-
ent processes at once ‘speak to each other’ but are flexible to the
iversity of contexts in which they are positioned. Whilst challeng-
ng, this could enable opportunities to link strategic intelligence
rom a wider range of previously isolated locations or contexts.
n addition, this form of ‘openness’ would raise the potential for
A to document diversity in worldwide innovation pathways in
iven sectors – in ways that recognise the benefits and trade-offs
ssociated with standardisation and diversity (Stirling, 2007). At
he same time, however, as discussed above, institutional innova-
ions and more responsive and plural governance are necessary for
hese kinds of approaches to take hold at national or international
evels. 43 (2014) 505– 518 515
12. Conclusion: broadening out and opening up national
and international TA for sustainable development
challenges
Across the world, TA is at a crossroads. The interconnectedness
of different nations and innovation systems, the shared nature of
global problems and the pace of innovation demands diverse and
coherent forms of communication and action. Urgent high profile
calls are made for global momentum towards more sustainable
innovation pathways – that are more robust in relation to societal
needs and values and legitimate and accountable in their orienta-
tion and implications. It has been argued above that TA practises
of various kinds have crucial roles to play in fostering more demo-
cratic appraisal of innovation to serve these goals. In this context,
a number of the lessons emerging from the present analysis may
hold value for design and implementation of more broadened out
and opened up TA.
There is a need to move beyond a series of unconnected, iso-
lated TA experiments, towards more coherently co-ordinated (but
still diverse) internationally networked approaches as illustrated
(notwithstanding its limitations) by the IAASTD. In allowing par-
ticipatory TA to be scaled up in wider areas of the world, the focus
should not just be on specific TA exercises in particular settings, but
also on broader cross-national programmes – enabling cumulative
distributed learning about contending innovation imperatives and
possibilities. TA at international levels should focus on maintaining
and enriching the diversity of social and technological approaches
to addressing particular challenges – as seen from plural perspec-
tives. A particular role for globally networked TA, is to enhance
visibility and scrutiny of increasingly intensive pressures for inter-
national harmonisation and standardisation.
There are obvious areas where resources and capabilities for
broader and more open forms of TA are currently especially lack-
ing. For instance, there is an urgent need for network support
and methodological capacity-building for TA in many developing
countries. The case studies in this paper refer to some extent to
external groups entering developing countries and co-ordinating
technology assessment activities. If developing country citizens
and stakeholders are to speak for themselves, they need to be
empowered not only to conduct, but also co-ordinate rigorous and
systematic assessments, drawing on and adapting the kinds of tools
discussed in this paper to suit local contexts and imperatives.
Resources, capacity and governance arrangements may  often
also be lacking or inappropriate for effective debate and decision
making in response to Open TA. Acknowledgement of these real-
ities forms an integral part of the quality of openness, not least
to avoid disillusionment – and disrespect of participants. Nev-
ertheless, the ‘broadening out’ and ‘opening up’ of TA described
here may  generate tacit learning within wider innovation systems,
even if particular outputs do not become the explicit basis for con-
crete ‘decisions’. In addition, it can catalyse a more transparent and
democratic debate around pathways to sustainability and develop-
ment.
Arguably the most crucial systemic requirements for more broad
and open TA are the same qualities towards which it arguably con-
tributes: a strengthening of responsive relations in the governance
of innovation – between business, academia, government and civil
society. Under these conditions, the characteristics of TA processes
analysed and advocated here, offer ways to help enhance both tech-
nical robustness, societal relevance and democratic accountability
in global innovation systems. Whilst they may present institutional
and political challenges that are not experienced in narrower (more
technocratic and instrumental) forms of TA, this is a necessary con-
sequence of doing justice to the magnitude of the current global
imperatives and potentialities for innovation with which this paper
began.
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In conclusion ‘broadening out’ and ‘opening up’ technology
ssessment enhances appreciations of the inherently social and
olitical implications, uncertainties and possibilities of innovation.
he cases here illustrate that these characteristics – already recog-
ised to varying extents in European debates – have a vital role
o play in international development processes at different levels.
nternationally networked and co-ordinated TA with these char-
cteristics can enable the vital energies and outputs of worldwide
nnovation systems to become more socially equitable, environ-
entally sustainable and democratically legitimate.
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